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Abstract
A well-documented finding in social stratification research is that employees in larger
work organizations earn more than those in smaller ones. This research first extends
the institutional context of this topic from the typical market economy to transitional
China. Mainly using two sets of nationally representative survey data, the research
examines the changing pattern of size-earnings relation from 1996 to 2006. Results
show that a significant size-earnings premium also exists in urban China and that it
doubled during this 10-year period. Moreover, individual and organizational
characteristics played contrasting roles in explaining the observed size-earnings
relationship. Specifically, individual characteristics had no impact on the size effect in
1996 but did reduce it in 2006; on the contrary, organizational characteristics partly
explain the size effect in 1996 but not in 2006. These findings are explained as the
results of increasing labor mobility and a declining redistributive mechanism during
this period, thus suggesting the development of China’s urban labor market.
Keywords: Organization size, Stratification
Background
The “new structuralism” in social stratification research highlights the role of structure
in the status attainment process. Work organization is one structural factor, and it is
even thought to link the “macro” and “micro” dimensions of inequality and play the
central role in bridging broad structure and specific socioeconomic achievement. Of all
organizational characteristics, size is a fundamental one, and it is also the most import-
ant correlate of diversity in organizational structures. Previous studies focusing on
size-earnings relation typically have found that employees of larger organizations earn
more than those who work for smaller employers, and many propositions have been
made to explain this relationship.
However, these findings and general explanations have typically only been pertinent
to market economies. Whether this specialized knowledge on size-earnings relation
also applies to societies operating within a different economic system is not clear yet,
although cross-national and cross-temporal examinations have suggested this relation
depends on institutional or cultural context and economic change. This research at-
tempts to extend the analysis on the relationship between organization size and eco-
nomic stratification into urban China, the second-largest national economy in the
world, and an economy quickly changing from a redistributive system to a market-
oriented system.
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In fact, students of Chinese stratification research emphasize the role of the work
organization, or danwei—a Chinese character equivalent to work unit or workplace.
However, two limitations are obvious. One is that what has been routinely focused on
are three traditional attributes of work organizations, i.e., ownership, rank, and type,
whereas organization size has been almost totally neglected. The other one is that pre-
vious empirical findings have been generated from datasets that were collected primar-
ily before the mid-1990s and thus cannot reflect the most recent and dramatic changes
of China’s urban labor market.
Centered on the size-earnings relationship, the present study explores three ques-
tions. First, does organization size matter for economic stratification in urban China’s
context? Second, how such size effect can be explained by individual as well as
organizational characteristics? Third, has there been any temporal change for the an-
swers to the first two questions in accordance with China’s dramatic change since the
mid-1990s? Because of the rarity of highly comparable datasets, this research observes
just two time points: 1996 and 2006, aiming to provide a preliminary depiction of ten
years of change.1
The remainder of this article is as follows. Previous studies on the relationship be-
tween organization size and economic stratification are first reviewed. Limitations of
the general literature and the deficiencies of organization-based stratification research
in China’s context are then identified, which leads to the three research questions that
are answered in the study. Subsequently, two survey datasets are introduced, followed
by a description of the variables and specification of the models. Empirical results and
corresponding analysis are presented in detail in the following section. Finally, I con-
clude the research by summarizing its main findings and discussing its implications
and limitations.
Organization size and economic stratification
In stratification and mobility research, the status attainment paradigm focused almost
exclusively on the individual determinants of socioeconomic achievement, until the
“new structuralism” maintained that structure is both more important than and logic-
ally prior to individual attainment (Kalleberg and Sørensen 1979). Empirical research
from such a “structural” perspective showed that individual achievement is a function
of many structural factors, such as class, economic sector, or organization. Baron and
Bielby (1980) further theorized that work is structured at five levels: societal, institu-
tional, organizational, role, and individual, and furthermore, organizations link the
“macro” and “micro” dimensions of inequality and play the central role in bridging
broad structure and the specific status attainment process.
Of all organizational characteristics, size is a fundamental one, and it is also the most
important correlate of diversity in organizational structures. Based on earlier theoretical
and empirical work, Child (1973) established the substantive and consistent correlation
between organizational size and measures of six important dimensions of organiza-
tions across all five datasets he used. Furthermore, Simmel (1964) once argued for
a “quantitative determination of the group” (p. 87) whereby structural differences
among groups are produced by “mere numerical differences” (p. 97). This offers a
basis for the consequences of the sheer number of employees, a routine measure-
ment of organization size.
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Previous empirical research has typically focused on size-wages or size-earnings rela-
tion. The well-documented finding of such research was that employees of larger orga-
nizations earn more than those who work for smaller employers. Actually, the positive
relationship between firm size and employee wages was documented as early as 1911
(Oi and Idson 1999). Such a “main effect” of size-earnings premium is so ineradicable
that even controlling for various kinds of mediating factors, which are correlated with
both size and earnings, cannot fully remove it. Following the pioneering work of “bring-
ing the boss back in” by Stolzenberg (1978), a few scholars paid close attention to the
“moderated-effect” of size on the relationship between individual or occupational char-
acteristics and earnings attainment. For example, Sakamoto and Chen (1991) chal-
lenged the conventional sociological wisdom that, for white male employees in the
USA, returns to education are substantially greater in larger establishments. Based on a
much larger dataset and a more rigorous methodology than had been used before, they
found that the effect of schooling does not vary systematically by establishment size. In
addition, Villemez and Bridges (1988) employed a matched employer-employee dataset
to investigate the linkage between organizational size and individual earnings and found
the situation to be quite complicated, rather than straightforward. According to their
findings, size effect varies by gender, occupation, and industry group and is differen-
tially mediated by internal labor markets, literacy requirements, and unionization.
Others extended the analysis on size-earnings relation by investigating the temporal
change or cross-national variation. For example, different from findings by Idson and
Oi (1999) that there was a large increase in the size-wage effect in manufacturing in-
dustry through the 1960s and 1980s in the USA, Hollister (2004) discovered a signifi-
cant decline of the size-wage effect between 1988 and 2003, an apparent reversal of the
earlier trend. The author attributed this declining trend to a number of changes in the
US economy in the past few decades, such as shifts in organizational structure and,
particularly, the decline of internal labor markets. Using data from the USA, Japan, and
Norway, Kalleberg and Van Buren (1992) conducted a cross-national analysis of the
size-earnings relation and found it to be especially pronounced and persistent in the
USA. According to the authors, the smaller size-earnings differences in Norway could
be explained by the egalitarian values and the centralized collective bargaining system,
and the cultural values of social harmony and solidarity in Japan may also tend to re-
duce size-earnings differences.
Since the economist Lester (1967) stated that “size-of-establishment differentials in
total compensation are too significant to disregard in wage theory, but they have yet to
be satisfactorily treated in theoretical terms” (p. 67), considerable headway has been
made in explaining why larger organizations pay their employees higher wages. How-
ever, despite the vast amount of research on the size-earnings relation, there still lacks
an agreed-upon explanation for its existence. Scholars have proposed various hypoth-
eses to account for such relationship, many of which can be grouped into four general
explanations: market environment, labor force quality or the labor-sorting process,
labor-management relations, and the structure of employment relations. These are
briefly summarized as follows.2
The most common explanation is that large firms hold monopolistic positions in
their product markets that allow them to earn excess rent, some of which is shared
with workers through higher wages. As industries are rough proxies for product
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markets, industry-based differences may lead to size-earnings correlation. This may
happen in two ways: certain industries tend to have both larger firms and higher wages,
and firm size may matter only within certain industries. Size-earnings differential may
also be due to local labor market conditions. For example, small firms may tend to be
in smaller communities with fewer alternative job options and therefore maintain low
wages. In this situation, size-of-organization differentials could really reflect size-of-
place differences.
Neoclassical economists suggest that employees of larger organizations earn more be-
cause they are of higher quality than those employed by smaller organizations. Sorting
and selection mechanisms channel higher quality workers with higher levels of both
measured and unmeasured human capital to larger organizations.
Size-earnings differential may be due to the higher rate of unionization in large firms
and unions’ tendency to raise wages. In addition, larger non-unionized organizations
are generally thought to pay their employees higher wages in order to avoid
unionization in the future (the so-called “union threat effect”). Considering internal
equity pressures created by unions, Kalleberg and Van Buren (1992) generalized the
unionization explanation to hypothesize that larger organizations have more problem-
atic labor-management relations and that higher wages are used to help alleviate the
negative consequences of conflict.
Previous research has found a strong correlation between size and a wide range of
organizational practices, including horizontal and vertical differentiation, formalization,
administrative intensity, internal labor markets, provision of training, etc. Among them,
the most direct connection to size-earnings differential is internal labor market, which
is used to describe structured employment relationships that include internal promo-
tion along established job ladders and commitment to long-term employment. Another
reason for why large employers pay more to workers of the same quality is that they
are less able to judge accurately the productivity of their employees (so-called “moni-
toring costs”).
Criticism and research questions
One notable limitation of previous research on size-earnings relation, as introduced
above, is that the typical findings and general explanations are only pertinent to soci-
eties operating in market economies. Thus, whether the specialized knowledge that the
academic community has accumulated in the past decades also applies to societies op-
erating in different economic systems is not yet clear. This research is an attempt to ex-
tend the analysis into China, the second-largest national economy in the world, and an
economy that is quickly changing from a redistributive system to a market-oriented
system.
To be fair, students of Chinese stratification and mobility research do emphasize the
role of work units or danwei (Walder 1986). For example, Lin and Bian (1991) derived
a status attainment model for urban Chinese by paying close attention to the signifi-
cance of work sector status as a destination variable and concluded that “social mobility
becomes a matter not of getting a better job or making more money but rather of get-
ting into the right work units” (p. 659). In the traditional danwei system in China, a
work unit’s structural position in the redistributive hierarchy is mainly indicated by
three attributes: ownership, especially for the dichotomy of state owned vs. non-state
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owned; rank, either in the bureaucratic hierarchy in general or in the budgetary
structure in particular; and type, which differentiates organization’s strategic func-
tion (Bian 1994).
Empirical data, which were collected at Tianjin city from the 1980s to the early
1990s, consistently validated the danwei-based stratification regime in urban China. For
example, Bian (1994)’s descriptive statistics demonstrated that state-sector employees
have a higher status than collective (and also private) employees in all six variables that
measure characteristics of the labor force. The strongly positive association between
the state-owned work unit and the individual worker’s salary, bonus, and total income
was also warranted in the multiple regression analysis (Walder 1990). Not only was the
advantage of state-owned work units identified, but the danwei’s (budgetary) rank also
manifested its independent effect. The higher the budgetary rank of the controlling
government unit, the more likely workplaces are to offer a series of social services
(Walder 1992). In addition, a higher work unit rank was found to be significantly asso-
ciated with a higher level of income from 1978 to 1993 (Bian and Logan 1996). Subse-
quent analysis using more representative data found that, on the one hand, the
relationship between workers and their work units has ironically strengthened since the
late 1980s; however, on the other hand, the redistributive influence, represented by
work unit bureaucratic rank and state ownership, shows some tendency toward decline
(Wang and Wang 2005; Wu 2002; Zhou 2000). The most recent study by Bian and his
colleagues found that danwei-based stratification has weakened along with the develop-
ment of market economy (Bian et al. 2006).
There are two limitations of these studies on danwei-based stratification in urban
China. One is that what are routinely focused on are three traditional attributes of work
organizations, i.e., ownership, rank, and type. Although firm’s or danwei’s profitability
and industry classifications have been identified as new strong predictors for workers’
earnings (Hao and Li 2006; Xie and Wu 2008), organization size has been almost totally
neglected by researchers.3 The other limitation is that the empirical findings have been
based on datasets that were collected primarily before the mid-1990s, except for a few
studies (Bian et al. 2006; Xie and Wu 2008). Clearly, this cannot reflect the most recent
and dramatic changes of China’s urban labor market. It is well known that, due to the
large-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the influx of rural mi-
grants into cities, the landscape of stratification and inequality in urban China has
changed significantly since the mid-1990s. In addition, without an analysis of temporal
change, we are left in the dark about whether and how work units maintain their role
in stratification processes at the end of the second 30-year transition of the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC).
Centered on the size-earnings relationship, this study explores three questions. First,
does organization size matter for economic stratification in urban China’s context? Al-
though some studies have also examined the relationship between organization size
and non-economic job rewards, such as fringe benefits, promotions, and autonomy,
(e.g., Kalleberg and Van Buren 1996), this research mainly focuses on economic stratifi-
cation indicated by earnings. Second, how can such a size effect be explained by indi-
vidual as well as organizational characteristics? Due to data limitations in China, it is
not possible to take into account as many organizational variables as various explana-
tions suggest should be,4 but at least the size effect can be examined by controlling
Li The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2015) 2:17 Page 5 of 19
three organizational characteristics that are routinely emphasized by the existing dan-
wei literature, i.e., ownership, rank, and type. Third, is there any temporal change for
the answers to the first two questions, during China’s dramatic change since the mid-
1990s? Because of the rarity of highly comparable datasets, this research mainly com-
pares two time points: 1996 and 2006, aiming to provide a preliminary depiction on ten
years of change.
Data, variables and methods
Two datasets are analyzed in this research. One is the 1996 survey, Life Histories and
Social Change in Contemporary China, and the other is the 2006 survey, Chinese Gen-
eral Social Survey.5 Both datasets are nationally representative and use similar multi-
stage probability sampling procedures. Given the focus of this research, only the urban
samples were analyzed. There are two basic reasons for this. First, due to the sharp
rural-urban disparity created by the household registration (or hukou) system and other
institutions, urban China rather than the entire country is the more appropriate social
entity to compare to other industrialized societies. Second, China’s danwei system only
applies to cities/towns but not villages; thus, previous research on organization-based
stratification in China is only pertinent to urban society.
Following the traditional approach in the research field of size-earnings relation, the
urban samples of both datasets were further restricted in two ways. First, respondents
must have been employed when they were interviewed during the data collection
period for the two surveys. This is simply because the research interest of this study is
in whether and how workers’ earnings are determined by the size of the organization
with which they are affiliated. Second, only employees but not employers or self-
employed workers were analyzed. This is because the relationship between employers’
or small business owners’ earnings and the size of organization they operate is not as
theoretically interesting as it is for employees. According to these two criteria, it is clear
that the research population for the topic of size-earnings relation is actually wage
earners.
Most previous research also restricts the analysis to organizations in the private sec-
tor, as in the public sector the notion of “size” is often ambiguous, and the boundaries
of “organization” are often vague (see Brown and Medoff 1989). The situation is some-
what different in urban China’s context. That is, the public sector accounts for a signifi-
cant proportion of employment, even after several rounds of reform by the central
government on this sector.6 If the entire public sector were excluded from analysis, the
research results might project very limited, or even misleading, information in terms of
our understanding of China’s urban labor market. Furthermore, every non-government
danwei in the public sector in China is an independent entity in terms of financial ac-
counting as well as legal representative (see Bian 1994), so its organizational boundaries
are quite clear. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to retain employees in the non-
government danwei in the analysis. As for government employees, they could have sim-
ply been excluded from the study. However, since the sample size has already been
greatly reduced after restricting the research population as wage earners, the decision
to include them in the analysis was made to avoid further truncation of the sample7.
Therefore, government employees, along with employees in the non-government dan-
wei, will be retained in the analysis.
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The two datasets include comparable individual-level as well as organizational-level
variables. Organization size serves as the key explanatory variable of this research. Spe-
cifically, it is defined as employment size, measured by the number of employees of the
work organization. Information on ownership and type of work units was collected by
the two surveys in slightly different ways, but it did not hinder classifying work units
into four ownership types: state agencies, SOEs, collective enterprises, and private en-
terprises. The rank of the work unit was also asked about in different ways in the two
surveys. Although quite similar scales were used to indicate administrative rank, i.e., an
array of village or community level, township level, county level, prefecture level, prov-
ince level, and central level, the 1996 survey asked respondents to report the rank of
the work unit where he/she worked, but the 2006 survey asked respondents to report
the rank of the work unit that supervised his/her own work unit. The two measures are
not exactly the same, but they are equivalent in both conceptual and practical senses.
Conceptually, both of them measure organizational positions in the redistributive hier-
archy. Practically, both of them have been used in empirical studies. Therefore, the two
measures for organizational rank in the two datasets are comparable in substantive
meaning. Following the literature, the variable of rank is treated as continuous, ranging
from 0 to 6, where 0 refers to “no rank,” and 6 to “central-level.”
In addition to these two variables at the organizational level, a set of individual-level
covariates are used: sex, marital status, education, work experience, occupation, hukou,
and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership. Sex (1 for male, 0 for female) and
marital status (1 for ever married, 0 for never married) are binary variables. Education
is measured by years of schooling. Work experience was measured in years by the dif-
ference between the current age and the age at the first year of experience. Occupation
is measured by International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom et al. 1992).
These are all continuous variables. Hukou and CCP membership are two important
stratification indicators in China’s context (Wu and Treiman 2004). Both of them are
measured as binary variables, with 1 for urban hukou and party members. Finally, a
binary variable indicating whether the respondent was a government employee (yes = 1)
is used.
All of these variables are used to predict the individual’s (monthly) earnings resulting
from his/her work. Note that the inflation adjustment is made based on the yearly con-
sumer price index (CPI) published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) so that
the dollar is constant across two years. Both earnings and organization size are under-
taken a logarithm transformation, following the routine procedure employed by previ-
ous studies. Since both the 1996 and 2006 survey data are nationally representative,
regional variation should be seriously considered. This can be achieved by controlling
province dummies when addressing the size-earnings relation.
The estimation method is ordinary least square (OLS) regression. As there are two
sets of independent variables, one at the individual-level and the other at the
organizational level, they can be put into the regression model separately and then col-
lectively when year-specific dataset is analyzed. To detect the temporal change from
1996 to 2006, the two datasets are also pooled together to be analyzed. All the models
were estimated using STATA. Furthermore, the survey estimation procedure was used,
since both datasets are not simple random samples but adopt a multistage probability
sampling procedure. In the 1996 data, the survey estimation procedure adjusted sample
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clustering as well as stratifying and weighted the data by household size. But in the
2006 data, it only adjusted sample clustering and weighted the data by household size
because sample stratifying information was not well documented.
As this research involved comparison among different models, the sample size had to
be identical across them. After restricting the research population as wage earners, the
sample size of the 1996 and 2006 data are 1654 and 2257, respectively. However, the
missing data problem, for all of the variables introduced above, inevitably exists for
both two datasets. In the 1996 data, the case-wise deletion procedure loses nearly 10 %
of the legitimate respondents, yielding a net sample of 1501 cases. In the 2006 data, the
case-wise deletion procedure loses nearly 30 % of the legitimate respondents, yielding a
net sample of 1639 cases. In the descriptive statistics and formal regressions, the 1501
cases for 1996 and 1639 cases for 2006 are used, but the multiple imputation procedure
is also applied to both datasets to remedy the missing data problem and check the ro-
bustness of analysis results.
Results
The descriptive statistics of all of the variables used by this research are examined in
Table 1. By comparing the descriptive characteristics of samples in 1996 and 2006, one
can probe the basic changes of China’s urban labor market. Three observations are
notable.
First, employment structure underwent a dramatic change, especially for the relative
proportion of labors working in SOEs vs. private enterprises. In 1996, about 45.69 % of
the employees worked in SOEs, and only 5.81 % worked in private enterprises. But after
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of variables, urban China 1996 and 2006
1996 (N = 1501) 2006 (N = 1639)
Continuous variables
Monthly earnings (yuan) 468.96 (327.99) 1368.01 (2718.25)
Organizational size 1044.74 (2625.10) 649.10 (1788.40)
Organizational rank 2.26 (0.98) 2.78 (1.78)
Years of schooling 10.28 (3.08) 11.27 (3.32)
Age 37.60 (10.55) 36.06 (10.04)
Experience 18.78 (10.86) 15.22 (10.29)
Occupation (ISEI) 47.44 (15.33) 45.91 (14.28)
Discrete variables
Ownership type
State agencies 31.95 33.76
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 45.69 26.33
Collective enterprises 16.54 6.85
Private enterprises 5.81 33.06
Government employees 7.27 7.19
Male 58.51 57.84
Ever married 86.73 81.39
Urban hukou 94.08 83.74
Party membership 22.50 15.68
Data are weighted. For continuous variables, mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported; for discrete
variables, percentages are reported
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ten years, that percentage of workers in private enterprises surpassed of that in SOEs
(33.06 vs. 26.33 %). Second, the average employment size of work organizations
dropped sharply. The average number of employees across various kinds of organiza-
tions in urban China was slightly over 1000 in 1996 but was only over 600 in 2006, de-
creasing by 40 %. Since SOEs under the planned economy were typically characterized
by a large number of redundant employees, one important aspect of reform during the
1990s was to lay off part of its labor force (usually unskilled workers aged in their 40s
and 50s). As a result, it is not so surprising that the average employment size dropped
to a large extent.
Third, the labor force composition in urban China also changed a lot. What catches
our eyes immediately is the almost doubled percentage of rural hukou workers from
1996 to 2006 (5.92 vs. 16.26 %). Another change is the slightly increased years of
schooling (10.28 in 1996 vs. 11.27 in 2006). Finally, along with China’s economic
growth, workers’ monthly earnings in average increased by nearly two times from 1996
to 2006.
The zero-order correlation between logged organization size and logged worker earn-
ings is first examined (see Appendix Table 8). Previous studies usually found such a bi-
variate correlation to be statistically significant. However, this was not the case in 1996
for urban China. Interestingly, after controlling province dummies, a positive size-
earnings correlation is established. In contrast, organization size and worker earnings
were significantly correlated in 2006, no matter whether controlling for province dum-
mies or not. The reason a significant size-earnings correlation in 1996 existed only after
controlling province dummies may be that many large-size enterprises, particularly
SOEs, were located in provinces/regions where local economic performance was quite
bad. A good example is that many large heavy-industry SOEs are located in northeast
China, i.e., Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang province. In the mid-1990s, these SOEs
employed a large number of redundant workers and suffered serious financial difficul-
ties. As a result, the profit-making capacities of these large SOEs lagged behind small
enterprises that were located in coastal provinces where the average economic perform-
ance was much better. Since employees’ earnings are intrinsically determined by their
work units’ profit performance, size-earnings relation is inevitably disturbed by such
provincial variation. However, radical reform of SOEs initiated at the national level
since 1997 has fundamentally changed this situation. A large number of redundant
workers were laid off to alleviate burdens for SOEs, many small or medium deficit-
ridden SOEs were privatized, and large SOEs were granted plenty of capital, resources,
and policy privileges by the central government. Thus, it is not surprising that the
zero-order correlation between size and earnings can be established now, even without
accounting for provincial variation. From a different perspective, the change observed
between 1996 and 2006 also demonstrates that China’s urban economy is becoming
more unified across provinces/regions.
Turning to the essential regression models, as size-earnings relation in 1996 can only
be established by ruling out provincial disturbance, all of the models that are estimated
for both 1996 and 2006 data control province dummies. Results for the 1996 data are
displayed in Table 2. Model 1 is the baseline model, showing the overall size effect on
earnings (controlling for province dummies). As both size and earnings are undertaken
logarithm transformations, the coefficient 0.039 means that a 1 % increase in
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organization size is related to a 0.039 % increase in earnings. Although this effect seems
to be small, it is not. Given that organization size ranges widely from less than 100 em-
ployees to over several thousand, the finding suggests that workers in smaller organiza-
tions earn considerably less than workers in larger organizations. For example, a 500 %
increase in organization size, from 100 to 600, would be associated with 7 % higher
wages (60.039 = 1.07).
Model 2 controls organizational covariates to quantify the net size effect. Strikingly,
the coefficient decreases by 15 %. This means that a significant part of the size-
earnings relation can be explained by other organization characteristics that have been
identified by previous danwei literature, i.e., ownership, type, and rank. However, con-
trolling for individual-level variables did not change the size coefficient at all in spite of
their significant effects on earnings (see model 3). The contrast between model 2 and
model 3 implies that in 1996, organizational characteristics were more important than
individual characteristics in explaining the size-earnings relation in urban China. In
Table 2 OLS regressions of (ln) earnings on (ln) organizational size and selected control variables,
urban China 1996 (N = 1501)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(ln) Size 0.039** 0.033* 0.040** 0.038**




State-owned enterprises −0.134** −0.029
(0.036) (0.035)
Collective enterprises −0.211* −0.098
(0.088) (0.083)













Occupation (ISEI) 0.004** 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002)
F 10.86*** 12.31*** 16.20*** 16.23***
R2 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.26
Data are weighted. Unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. Province
dummies and constant term are controlled
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two tails test)
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model 4, in which organizational and individual variables were collectively controlled,
the net effect of size on earnings is estimated at 0.038.
Results of essential regression models for the 2006 data are shown in Table 3. The
overall size effect on earnings (controlling for province dummies) is estimated at 0.089
in the baseline model (see model 1), meaning that a 1 % increase in organization size is
related to a 0.089 % increase in earnings. In model 2, organization-level variables are
controlled, but this had no substantial influence on size effect. Model 3, controlling
individual-level rather than organizational-level variables, reveals that the size effect de-
creased by 19 %. The contrast between model 2 and model 3 implies that in 2006, indi-
vidual characteristics are more important than organizational characteristics in
explaining the size-earnings relation in urban China, a reverse of the pattern from
1996. Finally, collectively controlling for organizational and individual-level variables
yielded a net size effect of 0.077 (see model 4).
Why is it that individual characteristics had no impact on size-earnings relation in
1996 but reduced the correlation in 2006? Recall that one explanation for observed
Table 3 OLS regressions of (ln) earnings on (ln) organizational size and selected control variables,
urban China 2006 (N = 1639)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(ln) Size 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.072*** 0.077***




State-owned enterprises −0.134* 0.025
(0.060) (0.058)
Collective enterprises −0.154* 0.029
(0.072) (0.069)













Occupation (ISEI) 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
F 19.76*** 18.10*** 32.20*** 29.68***
R2 0.27 0.28 0.40 0.41
Data are weighted. Unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. Province
dummies and constant term are controlled
*p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001 (two tails test)
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size-earnings relation is that sorting and selection mechanisms channel higher quality
workers with higher levels of both measured and unmeasured human capital to larger
organizations. If this makes sense, then the answer should lie in the gradual increase of
labor mobility across work organizations in China’s urban labor market. It is known
that under China’s danwei system in the pre-reform period, lifetime employment was
very pervasive, and there was actually no labor market at all. Since each work unit had
“ownership rights” over its workers for the production of goods or services, and each
government jurisdiction also had “ownership rights” over workers in the enterprises
and the institutions it supervised, resignations, dismissals, and job transfers became vir-
tually nonexistent for ordinary workers (Naughton 1997). Workers themselves virtually
had no say in choosing the work units they could enter or change.
During the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, the urban reform apparently did not suc-
cessfully boost labor mobility, despite many policies being issued by the central govern-
ment aiming to dismantle the lifetime employment system. Thus, a true labor market
was still lacking. As noted by Xie and Hannum (1996) in their analysis on the data from
the 1988 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP), “the relationship between em-
ployers and employees remains essentially in the old socialist order, although economic
reforms have generated new manifestations of this relationship” (p. 979). Moreover,
life-history data collected in 1994 in urban China indicated that, despite growing op-
portunities outside the state sector since the early 1980s, only limited changes occurred
in job-shift patterns (Zhou et al. 1997). As labor mobility was still quite limited during
this period, labor-sorting processes that are thought to channel higher quality workers
into larger work organizations had little applicability to urban China in 1996. There-
fore, it is not surprising that the size-earnings correlation cannot be reduced by simply
controlling for individual characteristics of employees.
Only in the late 1990s did the Chinese government begin to change social conditions
by weakening workers’ organizational dependence on their work units so as to facilitate
labor mobility, and these changes mainly included the housing provision undergoing
rapid commercialization and the social security system becoming detached from the
danwei. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, SOEs have experienced rapid and large-scale
privatization since the mid-1990s, and millions of workers have been retrenched from
the state sector to make a living in the market. It is very difficult for retrenched workers
to find suitable and decent jobs, and this process inevitably involves frequent changes
of employers (Li and Zhang 2003). At the same time, rural migrants increasingly en-
tered cities/towns to find non-agricultural jobs during the 1990s–2000s, and frequently
changing jobs is a main characteristic in this very competitive labor market (Zhang
2011). All of these forces have increased labor mobility rate since the late 1990s (Li
2013). The labor-sorting process can now operate, as the condition of labor mobility
was satisfied in 2006. As a result, it is not surprising that size-earnings relation can be
partly explained by controlling for the individual characteristics of employees.
The question then arises as to why organizational characteristics partly explained the
size-earnings relation in 1996 but lost their influence by 2006? Note that the variables
at the organization level only indicate three characteristics that are thought to be sig-
nificant mechanisms for danwei-based stratification in redistributive systems: owner-
ship, type, and rank. A few studies, conducted in the early 1990s concluded that
redistributive institutions continue to be significant or even dominant mechanisms of
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social stratification (e.g., Bian and Logan 1996). If this is valid, then the three indicators
that reflect organizational positions in redistributive systems should be more meaning-
ful than the simple measure of size. Thus, it is observed that the size-earnings relation
can be explained partly by the other three dimensions of work units in the 1996 data.
Accordingly, the possible explanation for the disappearance of this observation in the
2006 data is that the role of redistributive mechanism diminishes, given China’s rapid
transition to market economy in the 10-year period.
The statistical patterns of size-type and size-rank associations at the organization
level further consolidate the above explanation that the redistributive mechanism di-
minishes. In Table 4, the sample is grouped according to the quartiles of organization
size, and for each subsample, the distributions of organization type (as reported by per-
centages) and rank (as reported by means) are displayed. This shows that compared to
smaller organizations, larger organizations are more likely to be SOEs but less likely to
be private enterprises, and their administrative ranks also tend to be higher. Since such
association patterns clearly exist in both the 1996 and 2006 data, one cannot attribute
the disappearance of explanation power of organizational type and rank in 2006 to the
hypothetical different associations between size and the other two organizational char-
acteristics. In Table 5, a series of log-linear models estimated for the associations
among type (denoted as T), size (denoted as S), and year (denoted as Y) are presented.
The first model implies that there is no any association among the three variables. The
second model implies there are associations between type and year and between size
and year, but there is no association between type and size. The third model implies
that type is associated with size, but neither of them is associated with year. The fourth
model implies the association between type and size does not change by year. Model 4
is indeed the non-saturated model that fits the data well. Therefore, the supplementary
analysis in Tables 4 and 5 lends more confidence toward explaining the observed con-
trast between Tables 2 and 3 as the redistributive mechanism losing its power.
Redistributive institutions not only lose power in explaining size-earnings relation in
2006, but also fail to be important determinants of worker earnings, as reflected by the
coefficient of rank in the models. In 1996, a one-level increase of an organization’s rank
was associated with a 6 % increase of employee’s earnings (e0.056 = 1.06, see model 4 in
Table 2), but in 2006, the coefficient became insignificant (see model 4 in Table 3).
Table 4 Size-type and size-rank associations at organization-level in 1996 and 2006 data, urban
China
1996 (N = 1501) 2006 (N = 1639)
Size Size
Small 2 3 Large Small 2 3 Large
Type (percent)
State agencies 47.47 40.80 25.00 11.20 27.14 38.05 33.17 21.46
SOEs 20.53 31.47 53.46 77.60 8.07 18.29 30.73 55.61
Collective 16.53 19.73 18.62 10.40 4.65 6.83 10.24 8.78
Private 15.47 8.00 2.93 0.80 60.15 36.83 25.85 14.15
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Rank (mean) 1.63 2.04 2.41 2.79 1.83 2.75 3.03 3.73
N 375 375 376 375 409 410 410 410
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Actually, organizational rank had already been found to be losing its predictive power
for income by other studies (Zang 2002). Tables 2 and 3 also show that employees in
private enterprises earn more than their counterparts working in other economic sec-
tors (see model 4). Again, this find already emerged from other studies (Xie and Wu
2008; Zang 2002; Zhou 2000).
To check the robustness of the estimated effect of size on earnings in model 4 in
both Tables 2 and 3, four more control variables at the individual-level, including mari-
tal status, hukou, party membership, and government employees, are added into the
model. The results are listed as model 5a for the 1996 data and model 5b for the 2006
data in Table 6. Remarkably, for both datasets the reestimated coefficients are quite
similar to previous ones obtained. As mentioned before, there is the missing data prob-
lem in both datasets, so the multiple imputation procedure is used as a remedy. The re-
sults are listed as model 6a (for the 1996 data) and model 6b (for the 2006 data) in
Table 6. As one can see, the pattern of results remains the same between the case-wise
deletion procedure and the multiple imputation procedure.
How about the change of the size-earnings correlation from 1996 to 2006? Although
it is obvious that the size effect nearly doubled from 1996 to 2006, such a change
should be formally tested. This is conducted by pooling the two datasets together and
then estimating the interaction effect between organization size and year dummy.
Based on previous analysis, three models are estimated, and all of the results are pre-
sented in Table 7. The first model only incorporates three key variables (controlling for
province dummies): logged size, year dummy, and the interaction between them. The
Table 5 Log-linear models for associations among type (T), size (S), and year (Y) in 1996 and 2006
data, urban China
Model df L2 BIC ID P
M1: (T) (S) (Y) 24 1132.582 939.335 0.241 0.000
M2: (TY) (SY) 18 704.238 559.302 0.193 0.000
M3: (TS) (Y) 15 502.880 382.101 0.160 0.000
M4: (TS) (TY) (SY) 9 10.730 −61.738 0.021 0.295
Contrast df L2 P
M3 vs. M4 6 492.15 0.000
Table 6 Robustness check for size effect on earnings, urban China 1996 and 2006
1996 2006
Model 5a Model 6a Model 5b Model 6b
(N = 1501) (N = 1654) (N = 1639) (N = 2257)
(ln) Size 0.036** 0.032** 0.078*** 0.082***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Organization-level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 14.92*** – 26.91*** –
R2 0.27 – 0.42 –
Data are weighted. Unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. Province
dummies and constant term are controlled
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two tails test)
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second model additionally controls the basic organizational as well as individual char-
acteristics, including ownership type and rank, years of schooling, experience, experi-
ence squared, sex, and occupational ISEI. The third model adds the other four variables
at the individual-level, i.e., marital status, hukou, party membership, and government
employees. In all three models, the main effect of size and the interaction effect be-
tween size and year dummy are both positively significant, which suggests that the size-
earnings correlation indeed became larger from 1996 to 2006.
Discussion and conclusion
That employees in larger work organizations earn more than those in smaller ones is a
typical as well as robust finding in a market economy. This research extended the topic
into the context of China, the second-largest economy in the world and one that has
been undergoing a rapid market-oriented transition since its reform. Using two nation-
ally representative survey datasets, one conducted in 1996 and the other in 2006, this
research explored three questions centered on the size-earnings relation.
The first question was whether organization size mattered for earnings variation in
urban China. A zero-order correlation between size and earnings was indeed observed
in 2006 but not in 1996; however, after provincial or regional disparity was ruled out, it
was also established for 1996. The second question was concerned with how this size-
earnings relation could be explained by individual as well as organizational characteris-
tics. This correlation remains significant after the two sets of independent variables
were controlled. Despite this similarity between 1996 and 2006, a notable change was
also detected. This change lay in the relative power of organizational vs. individual
characteristics as the explanatory factors for size-earnings relation. Individual charac-
teristics had no impact on the size-earnings relation in 1996 but did reduce the size-
earnings correlation in 2006; on the contrary, organizational characteristics partly ex-
plained the size-earnings relation in 1996 but lost this influence in 2006. The third
question was about the temporal change of the size-earnings relation from 1996 to
2006. The net effect of organization size on worker earnings was found nearly doubled
Table 7 OLS regressions of (ln) earnings on (ln) organizational size and control variables for
pooled data, urban China 1996–2006 (N = 3140)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(ln) Size 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Year dummy (2006 = 1) 0.785*** 0.712*** 0.710***
(0.060) (0.059) (0.059)
(ln) Size* year dummy 0.043*** 0.038*** 0.039***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Organization-level variables No Yes Yes
Individual-level variables No Yes Yes
Additional control variables No No Yes
F 110.21*** 111.58*** 102.15***
R2 0.52 0.58 0.59
Unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. Province dummies and constant
term are controlled
***p < 0.001 (two tails test)
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during the 10-year period. This increment was indeed statistically significant in the for-
mal test by pooling the two data together.
What are the implications of these empirical findings? Basically, there are three. First,
it seems that, along with the market-oriented transition, organization-based stratifica-
tion in urban China is converging to a typical scenario in a market economy. This is
reflected by the fact that the size-earnings correlation remains significant even after
controlling for a set of individual as well as organizational characteristics. Furthermore,
the zero-order correlation is more robust in 2006 than in 1996, and the net size effect
even increases dramatically during the 10-year period.
Second, the changing pattern of explaining the size-earnings relation between 1996
and 2006 reveals the increase of labor mobility across work organizations, thus suggest-
ing the development of China’s urban labor market. As observed by some researchers
(e.g., Xie and Hannum 1996), the employment relationship remains essentially un-
changed in the early stages of economic reform. In the late 1990s, however, the Chinese
government began to change institutional conditions by weakening workers’ depend-
ence on their work units. Since then, labor mobility across work organizations has been
boosted (Li 2013), leading labor-sorting processes to make the role in channeling
higher quality workers into larger organizations. This has resulted in the reduction of
the size-earnings correlation due to controlling for individual characteristics, a pattern
that was not observed in 1996.
Third, there is the sign that the redistributive mechanism has diminished during
China’s transition toward a market economy. This is not only reflected by the dis-
appearance of its explanative power for the size-earnings relation in 2006 but is also
suggested by the finding that organizational rank fails to be a significant determinant of
workers’ earnings. However, one should be cautious about the generalization on the
relative dominance of redistributive vs. market mechanism in the process of China’s re-
form. Although this is the key issue in the great debate around the theory of market
transition (see Chen 2006), some more elaborate research has already cautioned that it
is not appropriate to simply use certain observed variables to indicate underlying mech-
anisms (Wu and Xie 2003). Clearly the observed effect of organization size on earnings
should not be naively attributed to market mechanism because it could also be the re-
sult of redistributive mechanism operated in indirect ways, or the outcome could be
generated by both the market and the redistributive mechanism.
This study showed that in urban China’s transition context, organization size is
indeed another significant contributor to earnings inequality, in both statistical and
substantive senses. Thus, further attention and examination should be paid to this size-
earnings relation. There have been various propositions to account for the size-
earnings relation in the literature, mainly including the market environment (e.g.,
industrial sector), labor force quality or labor-sorting process, labor-management rela-
tions (e.g., unionization), and structure of employment relations (e.g., internal labor
market). Due to data limitations, this research is capable of testing only a few of them,
such as the labor-sorting process. Therefore, more work needs to be done to explain
the observed size-earnings relation in urban China.
This research also finds that the strength of correlation between organization size and
wage significantly increased from 1996 to 2006. In order to test the robustness of this in-
creasing trend, I further analyzed the data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS)
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in 2003 and 2005.8 By using the similar working samples, analytical variables and regres-
sion models, zero-order correlation of organization size and earnings, correlation control-
ling for province dummies, regression coefficient controlling for main intervening
variables, and regression coefficient controlling for all variables are estimated. Comparing
the estimates in 1996, 2003, 2005, and 2006 in the Appendix Table 8, one can see that the
size effect increases across the time. Using the estimates of full model as an example, the
elasticity coefficient in 1996 is 0.036, 0.044 in 2003, 0.049 in 2005, and 0.078 in 2006. For
a more rigorous and systematic research on the dynamic trend of the relationship be-
tween organization size and wage, one needs to analyze more data of following years. But
more importantly, how can we explain this increase? Is it a result of the development of
the urban labor market or a by-product of the decrease in the average size of organiza-
tions? Regarding the period analyzed in this research from 1996 to 2006, the average
organization size decreased in general, due to the reform of SOEs (see the Appendix Table
8).9 Meanwhile, the institution reform also happened in this period, making it hard to dis-
tinguish their effects. This deserves further study in following research.
Finally, this research used only household survey data in which organizational charac-
teristics were reported by individual respondents. To address the relationship between
work organization and social stratification, this type of data is inferior relative to
employers-employees matched data. Thus, future study on this topic in China should
try to collect data in more creative ways, similar to what has been done in other coun-
tries during the past several decades.
Endnotes
1However, in order to test the robustness of the trend of size-earnings relation, this
research also analyzes the data of the years of 2003 and 2005. Please refer to the last
section of this paper for details.
2This brief summary is mainly based on six pieces of literature: Brown and Medoff
(1989), Kalleberg and Buren (1992), Reilly (1995), Kalleberg and Buren (1996), Troske
(1999), and Hollister (2004).
3An exception is the research conducted by Walder (1992), in which workplace size
was indeed found to be a significant predictor for workers’ job benefits in the city of
Tianjin.
4It is mainly because that the 1996 survey did not collect enough information on
respondent’s work and organization, such as industry.
5For the 1996 survey, see http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/da/lhsccs/chinaweb.html.
For the 2006 survey, see http://cgss.ruc.edu.cn/.
6At the end of 2005, employees in the state-owned danwei accounted for nearly one
quarter of all workers in urban areas. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/
indexch.htm.
7Actually, in comparing the basic patterns of size-earnings relation obtained from
this procedure to those from the procedure excluding government employees, there is
no notable divergence for either of the two datasets. What is more, the main results are
quite similar if government employees are excluded.
8For CGSS project, please refer to the introduction by Bian and Li 2012.
9Although the average organization size in 2005 is slightly higher than that in 2003,
it generally decreases.
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